Major League Baseball (MLB) 
Introduction
This agreement, I believe, satisfies the competing interests with which we've had to contend to place a team in the nation's capital. From the very beginning, we were deeply concerned by the potential material effect this move to Washington D.C., which is in proximity to Baltimore, would have on the Orioles, its ownership and its fan base. -MLB Commissioner Allen H 'Bud' Selig ('MLB, Orioles reach compensation agreement, ' 2005, para. 3)
The 2005 move of the Montreal Expos to become the Washington Nationals was discussed almost immediately after Jeffrey Loria sold the team to Major League Baseball (MLB) owners on February 12, 2002 ('Relocation process expos-ed', 2004) . Although MLB did not begin accepting formal bids from cities for the Nationals until February 2003 (King, 2003) , the speculation that the team would be moved to Washington D.C. and the resistance from Orioles owner Peter Angelos began almost immediately. Angelos noted on March 21, 2002, 'The simple economics of baseball say that to put two major league franchises so close together would detract from each other very substantially and make both of them incapable of generating the revenues necessary to provide competitive teams for their fans' ' p. 38) . During the two-and-one-half years between the Nationals sale and the official announcement of the move to Washington D.C., compensation for financial losses Angelos might face due to the infringement on his territory and the potential for a lawsuit were prominent topics in the press (Neyer, 2003) . Angelos defined his territory as extending from Pennsylvania to North Carolina, while MLB countered that it owned all territories and licensed them to individual teams (Fisher, 2005b) .
Major League Baseball initially proposed a financial plan to compensate Angelos for the presence of a team in the Orioles territory and, according to one MLB official, the plan was so close to being accepted that he 'didn't see anything that could gunk this up' (Stark, 2004, para 8) . Despite guaranteeing Angelos a yearly minimum revenue figure and a promised franchise price upon sale, Angelos initially did not accept MLB's offer and threatened litigation (Stark) .
Even though the matter between Angelos and MLB was unresolved, on December 3, 2004 MLB formally approved the Nationals move from Montreal to Washington D.C. (Blum, 2004) . As MLB owned the Nationals and were losing money despite playing home games in Montreal and San Juan, Puerto Rico, they were determined to relocate the franchise to a sustainable market. The lone vote against the move to Washington D.C.
was Baltimore Orioles owner Peter Angelos (Blum) . Once the move was approved, MLB only had to resolve its issues with Angelos, finalize stadium construction plans, complete negotiations with minor league affiliates and find a buyer for the team -issues that took considerable time and effort.
The resolution to the territorial dispute between Angelos and MLB was finalised March 31, 2005. MLB and the Baltimore Orioles arranged a compensation agreement that permitted the Nationals' games to be seen on regional television in Baltimore and Washington D.C. (Fisher, 2005b) . The agreement established the Mid-Atlantic Sports Network (MASN), which serves as the regional cable home of the Nationals and will eventually become the cable home of the Orioles (Fisher, 2005b) . Orioles owner Peter Angelos will control MASN while paying the Nationals a yearly rights fee of $25-$30 million (the amount will be reviewed after a five year period) (Fisher, 2005b) . The owners of the Nationals (initially MLB but now Theodore Lerner) will receive an initial 10% minority share of MASN that will gradually increase to 33% after 20 years (Fisher, 2005a; Heath, 2005) .
In addition to the cable television component, the agreement also guarantees Angelos $365 million if he ever elects to sell the franchise, though Angelos was unable to secure a guarantee for his yearly local revenues (Fisher, 2005b , Heath, 2005 . Bob DuPuy, MLB President and COO noted, ' We were dealing with essentially the intersection of the Orioles' need to be protected coupled with our absolute demand that such protection come from the industry in general and not at the expense of the Nationals,' (Fisher, 2005b , para 11).
Steve Schott, former owner of the Oakland Athletics (A's), had monitored the move of the Nationals into the Orioles' territory as he had desired to potentially move to Santa Clara County, specifically San Jose, California (Newhouse, 2004b) . Santa Clara County was once the territory of the A's, but in 1992, the A's permitted the rights to the county to be transferred to the San Francisco Giants with the expectation that the Giants would move ('San Jose would like…,' 2004) . Although the Giants twice were unsuccessful in their attempt to garner a tax-payer funded facility in the South Bay, they have remained steadfast in their belief that Santa Clara County is their territory and therefore forever offlimits to the Oakland franchise (Weiner, 2006) . Despite San Jose's population making it the largest city in the San Francisco Bay Area, its position as the capital of the Silicon Valley computer industry, the marketing success of the National Hockey League's (NHL) San Jose Sharks, and Santa Clara county's preliminary support for pursuing the A's ('San Jose would like…,' 2004) , the A's were not even permitted an opportunity by MLB to negotiate a compensation package with the Giants for a move to San Jose (Ostrom & Lynch, 2006) . Rebuffed in his efforts to explore San Jose as an option, new A's owner Lewis Wolff elected to pursue a move to Fremont, CA -a smaller city with less business development than San Jose, but one located within the A's territory of Alameda County ('Reports: Athletics will build…, ' 2006) . Since San Francisco is closer to Fremont (36 miles) than San Jose (47 miles), the A's inability to even pursue a San Jose stadium appears to pose potential contradictions -especially in light of MLB's negotiations with Peter Angelos when the Expos moved more than 600 miles into the Baltimore Orioles' territory. This paper investigates pertinent sport franchise relocation cases and examines the legal basis for the current territorial rights in MLB. This paper also investigates some of the financial implications of restricting the A's from negotiating and potentially moving to San Jose. Specifically, the paper reviews: a) antitrust law as it pertains to North American professional sport leagues b) pertinent league relocation cases, c) MLB territorial rules, d) financial arguments why leagues desire to control relocation, e) financial components of MLB's Collective Bargaining Agreement, and f) the legal and financial impact of a challenge to the San Francisco Giants' territorial rights to San Jose.
Antitrust Law applied to North American Professional Sports
The primary law governing antitrust activities in the United Stated is the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C.) which was passed as a response to the anti-competitive practices of large firms forcing out smaller competitors (Moynihan, 1980) . The Sherman Act established absolute laws and cited equity powers of the federal courts to stop violations of the act and established that violators must pay treble damages (Freedman, 1987) . Section 1 prohibits conspiracies or coordinated group activity designed to restrain trade between those who would otherwise be competitors, while Section 2 prohibits monopolization through price fixing or similar activities (15 U.S.C. § 1 & § 2).
The courts have adopted three tests to evaluate whether a defendant unreasonably restrained trade and therefore violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act (Wolohan, 2007) .
The per se rule will be applied when any anti-competitive activity involving price fixing, market division, tying arrangements, or group boycotts occurs and the violating activity has no benefit to competition in the industry (Masteralexis, 2001) . If the practice is determined to be illegal per se, the court does not have to examine the practice's impact on the market before finding the practice violated antitrust law (Wolohan, 2007 ). For example, in Radovich v. National Football League (1957 352 U.S. 445, a professional American football player challenged a league rule which would only allow him to sign a contract with the team that held his playing rights. Radovich contended that the league rule resulted in his being blacklisted and that the blacklist was a group boycott in violation of Section 1 (U.S.C. 15) and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed (Radovich).
The rule of reason will be applied when a violation of Section 1 might possibly result in a benefit to consumers or when it is conducted as a necessary business practice (Freedman, 1987) . To apply the rule of reason, an analysis of the restraint's effect on competition must be performed; therefore, an economic and legal analysis must be conducted on a case-by-case basis to determine if Section 1 was violated (Wolohan, 2007) . In NCAA v. Oklahoma (1984) 468 U.S. 85, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act as its college football (American football) television plan was anticompetitive using the rule of reason. The Supreme Court held that the NCAA television plan was a restraint on the operation of the free market with the relevant market being college football (NCAA). In its analysis, the court examined the markets and parties affected and determined that the rule had an adverse effect on the college football market, and was not a necessary business practice. Evidence that the plan protected live attendance or maintained competitive balance was not found.
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The quick look rule of reason will be applied when a practice has obvious anticompetitive effects. In these cases, the court determines if pro-competitive justifications for the restraint outweigh the anticompetitive effects (Wolohan, 2007 In North American professional sports, the athlete and the franchise owner have been treated differently than other business people under the Sherman Act (Freedman, 1987) .
The unique nature of professional sports operations, where franchises compete against each other in some aspects while working together in others, makes the adaptation of the traditional forms of the Sherman Act difficult (Rosenbaum, 1987) . This has resulted in some confusion about antitrust assumptions and the nature of sports league organization and team operation. These assumptions have created inconsistency in the application of antitrust law to professional sport (Rosenbaum) .
In (Masteralexis, 2001 ).
Despite the perceived structural and operational similarity of various professional sports leagues, Major League Baseball is the only United States professional sports league to be granted antitrust immunity (Fein, 2005 Congress for specific immunity to anti-trust laws-particularly for television broadcasts (Masteralexis, 2001) . In 1961, Congress passed the Sports Broadcasting Act (15 U.S.C. § § 1291-1294) which granted professional sports leagues a limited antitrust exemption to permit them to negotiate television contracts (initially for over-the-air, but now includes cable broadcasts) as a league, rather than as individual teams (Masteralexis; Weiler & Roberts, 1993) . Prior to the Act, the right to broadcast a game was held by either team playing in the game, which threatened the territorial rights of weaker franchises as successful teams could broadcast their games into the territory of unsuccessful teams.
The Sports Broadcasting Act allowed professional sports league member clubs to black out telecasts of games within their home territory when playing home games (Bauer, 1993 ; 15 U.S.C § 1292). Additionally, sports leagues use this exemption to reach television agreements without violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act as they can act as a single entity (15 U.S.C. § 1291; Rosenbaum, 1987) .
League Relocation Cases
The Cleveland Rams of the National Football League (NFL) became the first major North American professional franchise to move to the west coast of the United States in 1946 (Gietschier, 1995) . Owner Dan Reeves provided an additional $5,000 to teams having to incur additional travel costs for the prolonged trip (Gietschier) . As more movement was necessary to preserve the quality of its product and that franchise stability was a key factor for a league's success (Campbell, 1983 Rosenbaum, 1987) . The defense begins with the idea that the league is an indivisible product, and without the structure and governing rules of enforcement which create a marketable enterprise, the consumer would have no interest in the results of any contest between two independent teams unaffiliated with league play (Rosenbaum) . Therefore, the leagues argue that since they are a single entity, there can be no illegal activity under Section 1 of the Sherman Act as Section 1 requires a conspiracy by two independent actors (Freedman, 1987 
History of MLB territorial rules
Because of MLB's longstanding exemption from antitrust regulation, the league has crafted its rules on franchise movement outside the court's jurisdiction, and, in most cases, away from media scrutiny. MLB territorial rules date to 1876 when the initial National League constitution established a team's control of a five mile radius around its city (Witt, 2005 Louis Browns then attempted to move to Baltimore, but were denied as at the time the American League required a three-quarter majority for any club to move (Veeck, 1962) .
The vote against the Browns move was 6-2 (Veeck The opposition to the initial expansion into Los Angeles was more likely focused upon who the potential new owner would be, rather than the actual presence of a franchise.
Hank Greenberg held the option for the new Los Angeles franchise, but his close relationship with Bill Veeck likely encouraged the other owners to stymie his opportunities to craft a workable lease arrangement that would enable him to be financially successful. Once Greenberg relinquished his option for a Los Angeles franchise, Gene Autry was unanimously accepted as the owner of the expansion Angels ('Angels timeline, ' 2005) . Autry had considerably greater financial resources than Greenberg and was able to handle the initial financial difficulties imposed upon the Angels by the Los Angeles Dodgers (Veeck, 1962) .
After the 1960 expansion, MLB relocation rules were changed to establish power with the individual leagues (Witt, 2005) . The National League determined territories to be 10 miles beyond a team's city limits, while the American League established a one hundred mile radius around a team's home ballpark (Witt) . Each league required a three-fourths vote to permit a team to move, but neither league could stop the other from relocating into the other's territory (Brown, 2004; Witt Bay, the Giants solicited MLB for expansion of their territory into Santa Clara and Monterrey Counties (Witt, 2005) . A request for expansion was solicited as it is an easier process than submitting for relocation (Witt) . Steve Schott, former Oakland A's coowner, recently commented on the Giants 1990 efforts to potentially move to San Jose, I believe that when Charlie Finley moved the A's out here, and the Giants were already here, there was no question and no discussions about territorial rights. The only way the Giants ended up with territorial rights was because they were going to build a stadium in San Jose (Brown, 2004 , para 10).
On June 14, 1990, the expansion was approved unanimously as the A's voted to approve the Giants' move because it would have allowed the A's to potentially attract the majority of baseball customers from Northern Bay Area counties such as Marin, Sonoma, and Napa ( Figure 1 ). An anonymous A's executive noted, 'We were reasonably happy and would have been reasonably happier if the Giants had moved to San Jose. Why would we get in the way?' (Witt, 2005, para 19 There was no question about whose territory it was. They had to get permission from the A's…They didn't pay for those territorial rights, by the way. Now, in the meantime, they built a stadium closer to Oakland than they were before. And now, if we talk about another stadium down in that area, they go berserk… (Brown, 2004, para 11) .
In December 1994, after failed attempts by the Giants to build in San Jose, MLB amended its territorial rules (Witt, 2005) . Currently, teams may only move to a new territory if three-fourths of the league clubs and one-half of other league clubs approve the relocation (Pappas, 2002a) . In addition, MLB Rule 52 i established territorial counties for each MLB franchise (Pappas, 2002a (Pappas, 2002a) .
The current territorial rules contain some unique provisions for teams in shared areas. For the American and National League franchises in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, the defined counties are the same, but in the case of the A's and Giants, the San Francisco Bay Area has been divided disproportionately (Pappas, 2002a) . The Giants territory includes San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Monterey, and Marin
Counties, while the A's territory only includes Alameda and Contra Costa counties (Pappas, 2002a; Witt, 2005) 
Financial Arguments why Leagues Desire to Control Franchise Relocation
Some would question why a league would prevent a franchise from relocating if it did not immediately and obviously harm the league in some way? Personality issues aside, there are a number of financial reasons to restrict franchise movement. Many of these fall under the rubric of an externality -in this case a spillover effect or impact on the league when a team relocates. If franchise relocation had no financial impact on the league, then there would be no externality. If franchise relocation benefits the team, but harms the league, then the league is being affected by a negative externality.
For instance, the city that loses the team could have fans who stop being customers of the league, or who might even be unwilling to support a future new replacement franchise in that area. Thus, the relationship between the league and customers in this area would be .
In some cases franchise relocation may create positive externalities for the entire league.
In those cases, the league should work to assist the moving franchise (assuming it would like to relocate) as the overall league will benefit financially. In theory, it would not be financially beneficial to restrict a team's relocation if the overall league would benefit.
Components of Major League Baseball's Current Collective Bargaining Agreement
In order to conduct a financial cost-benefit analysis of the league's relocation rules, the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) of the league must be analyzed. Pertinent financial components of the MLB 2002-2006 CBA include contraction, luxury tax, and revenue sharing.
The CBA mandated that no clubs could be contracted until after the 2006 season (Wittenmyer, 2006) . Prior to the completion of the CBA, the Oakland A's as well as the Minnesota Twins, Kansas City Royals, and Tampa Bay Devil Rays were mentioned as contraction candidates (Neyer, 2002) . The players insisted that no teams be contracted as that would have resulted in a decrease in employment opportunities. Their desire was to see distressed teams have an opportunity to improve their financial standing. Specifically for the A's, the new CBA provided time to move to another viable market or to a better facility within the Bay Area.
The luxury tax was imposed as a method to contain team payroll costs (see Table 1 ). To (Howard & Crompton, 2004) . For instance, the Seattle Mariners increased revenues over $20 million their first season after moving into Safeco Field, resulting in the team becoming one of the most valuable in MLB (Snel, 1999) .
Since the 1994 baseball work stoppage, the Oakland Athletics have had mixed success on the field and limited success on their income statement (Shea, 2003) . The Raiders, co-tenants in McAfee Coliseum, demanded and received structural changes to the facility that made it less appealing to baseball fans ('History of McAfee Coliseum,' 2005 ). Peter Angelos (who is a legendary trial lawyer) or because they did not pursue a legal challenge beyond initial investigations (Ostrom & Lynch, 2006) .
In addition to the legal contradictions MLB displayed during the Expos relocation and the A's attempt to move to San Jose, there have certainly also been unusual financial inconsistencies. The Expos move to Washington was a tremendous financial benefit for every MLB owner. The franchise had long been the lowest revenue generating club in the league and during one season did not even have an English language radio contract (Leahy, 2000) . The move to Washington resulted in a tremendous increase in franchise value that eventually led to the $450 million sale to Theodore Lerner ('Owners approve Nationals sale, ' 2006 (Veeck, 1962) . Veeck was forced to sell the Browns before he sued MLB, but he noted the legal and financial basis of his potential case:
Since it was evident on the face of the situation that it was in their (other owners) self-interest to have me in Baltimore and against their self-interest to have me in St. Louis -i.e., they would all make money in Baltimore and lose money in St. Louis -it was obvious that they were keeping me in St. Louis only because they did not like me personally…It is illegal…for a group of individuals to get together to cause injury or loss to any other individual. It is not only illegal to do it, it is illegal to discuss it. That is what the laws against restraint of trade -the monopoly laws -apparently are all about (p. 289-290).
In the Browns' case, the owners dislike for Bill Veeck's Although it appears that the A's have found a new home in Fremont, no one knows exactly how the ballpark will be financed and how much additional revenue the A's will generate ('A's seek tax increment financing, ' 2006) . Certainly, the potential move to San
Jose had many questions that remained unanswered when the A's began to shift their attention to a potential move to Fremont. However, at some point in the future, a MLB owner will be confronted with the inconsistent application of the relocation rules and will seek redress through the courts. In addition, an owner could solicit aid through Congress -which could remove the antitrust exemption. Given the potential future dismissal of its antitrust exemption by legal action or political lobbying, MLB should attempt to establish guidelines and implement actions that are fair and financially beneficial for all teams. If, in the future, an owner may not be easily compensated or willing to look elsewhere for a new location, the legal system could remove all aspects of the antitrust exemption to the detriment of the entire baseball industry. i MLB does not make Rule 52 (as well as some others) available to the public and no other citation for them is available. The only reason the details of the rule are known is because Doug Pappas had brief access to them. A note posted on his website (Pappas, 2002) before his recent, untimely death discusses this issue.
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